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I. Introduction
In 1989 the Indonesian legislature passed and President Suharto signed a new law 
governing the country's Islamic courts. The statute, known as the Religious Judicature 
Act2 (the Act), significantly enhanced the legal and institutional standing of the Islamic 
courts by providing formal legal guarantees of their security and increasing the level of 
state support. The Act also expanded and equalized the courts' powers. Prior to the 
passage of the Act the substantive competence of Islamic courts on the populous 
islands of Java and Madura extended only to matters of marriage and divorce. The 
1989 Act expanded the Islamic courts' jurisdiction to include inheritance throughout 
die country. The Act also strengthened the standing of the Islamic courts in relation to 
the civil courts by eliminating a rule dating from the nineteenth century which had 
required that decisions of Islamic courts must be ratified by a civil court to be 
enforceable.
The enactment of the Religious Judicature Act seemed to signal a reversal in New 
Order policy on the role of religion in public life and the enforcement of Islamic law.
1 Research for this article was supported by a grant from Southwestern University School of Law. I also 
wish to thank the editors and anonymous readers for Indonesia who provided valuable comments on an 
earlier version of this manuscript.
2 The Act is designated as Law No. 7 (1989).
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Although Islamic interests provided critical support in President Suharto's rise to 
power in the mid-1960s, the regime's actions over the ensuing two decades did not 
support Islamic involvement in the exercise of state power. Once in control, the New 
Order set about systematically to neutralize Islam as a basis for political and legal 
mobilization. Most observers in the 1970s would have found it unthinkable that in the 
1990s the Suharto government would be actively promoting state enforcement of 
Islamic doctrine.
This article seeks to place these recent developments in Islamic law in a broader 
context, and qualifies the initial assessment of their importance. Though significant, the 
Religious Judicature Act does not mark the dramatic shift in policy that at first blush it 
seems to indicate. Rather, it is to a large extent the culmination of events set in motion 
twenty years earlier. Moreover, while the Suharto government is clearly presenting a 
more Islamic demeanor, it has not abandoned its historic policy of controlling Islamic 
law and politics.
The next section of the article provides a brief historical introduction to the Islamic 
courts in Indonesia as background to more recent developments. In Part III I survey 
the key provisions of the 1989 Act and point out changes it makes to prior law. Part IV 
looks more closely at one specific issue treated in the Act—divorces initiated by men— 
to illustrate my thesis that recent events are largely continuous with policies 
established a quarter century earlier.
II. Historical Background to the 1989 Act
Islamic judicial institutions have operated in island Southeast Asia for centuries,3 
but die lineage of the present Indonesian Islamic courts is commonly traced to a Dutch 
Royal Decree of 1882. That Decree formally chartered a system of Islamic tribunals 
called "Priests' Councils" (priesterraden) to operate alongside the existing ordinary
3 Information about the administration of Islamic justice before the advent of European records is 
scattered and scarce. Anthony Reid has written that by the early seventeenth century, the major Islamic 
states in the region had established regular institutions for the implementation of Islamic law, although 
there is definite evidence for the existence of Islamic courts per se only in Aceh and Banten. See Anthony 
Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age cf Commerce, 1450-1680, Volume II: Expansion and Crisis (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993), pp. 182-84. Martin van Bruinessen has analyzed records from Banten, where the 
chief Islamic judge was appointed by die Sultan from at least the beginning of die seventeenth century 
until die office was abolished with die consolidation of Dutch control over the area in the middle of the 
nineteenth. Though originally an all-purpose religious official, over time the office of chief judge acquired 
a narrower adjudicative function. From the eighteenth century on, the chief judge exercised jurisdiction 
over all non-capital cases and administered a hierarchy of subordinate judges who heard cases at the 
district level. Martin van Bruinessen, "Shari'a court, tarekat and pesantren: Religious Institutions in the 
Banten Sultanate," Archipel 50 (1995): 165,168-72. Among the Javanese, the administration of Islamic 
justice was one of several functions performed by the penghulu—the chief administrator of the mosque— 
who conducted judicial proceedings in the portico of the mosque. The penghulu were appointed by and 
closely linked with the local aristocracy and stood in contrast to the other principal religious elite, the 
heads of Islamic boarding schools, who remained independent of political authority and had large mass 
followings. Although the reach of the penghulu's jurisdiction and the extent of the influence of Islamic 
doctrine is uncertain, the penghulu were apparently the primary judicial officers for the Javanese. See 
Daniel Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of Legal Institutions (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1972), pp. 10-13.
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courts in Java and Madura.4 The courts were to consist of the penghulu—the chief 
religious official of the district—and from three to eight members, with a minimum of 
three required to constitute a quorum.5 The collegial character of the courts was a 
Dutch innovation, apparently based on a misunderstanding of contemporary practice 
in which the penghulu, not well versed in the law, took advice from others who were 
more learned.6 Although the penghulu received a small civil service salary in his 
capacity as religious advisor to the civil court, the member judges were not civil 
servants and received no government compensation. Instead, they served on a per 
session basis and were compensated out of fees paid directly by litigants and a share of 
the estate in inheritance cases, which was also a principal source of emolument for the 
chairmen.7 Under an earlier regulation issued in the 1830s, Islamic court decisions had 
to be ratified by a civil court to be enforceable.8
The next significant intervention in the administration of Islamic law occurred in 
the 1930s. A series of regulations in 1937 called for a number of changes to the courts in 
Java and Madura, which were renamed "Penghulu Courts" (penghulu-gerecht), and 
established new tribunals, called "Kerapatan Qadi," in South Kalimantan.9 The 
regulations provided for the payment of salaries to the court chairmen and the 
addition of a salaried clerk. These reforms, which were not actually implemented for 
nearly a decade,10 were intended to promote the independence of the courts by 
reducing or eliminating their dependence on exactions from litigants, and to make 
them more modem and efficient. The regulations also provided for the formation of 
Islamic appeals courts, a change that had been recommended by C. Snouck Hurgronje, 
the renown Islamicist and colonial advisor on native affairs, as a means of promoting
4The Decree is designated Staatsblad (State Gazette) No. 152 (1882). For a discussion of the enactment see 
Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945 
(The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), pp. 83-85; Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 13-14; H. Z. A. Noeh and H. A. B. 
Adnan, Sejarah Singkat Pengadilan Agama Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: Bina Emu, 1983), pp. 32-35; and Karel 
Steenbrink, Beberapa Aspek tentang Islam di Indonesia Abad ke-19 (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984), pp. 220-223.
5 Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 14.
6 Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, p. 84; Steenbrink, Islam di Indonesia Abad ke-19, pp. 221-222.
7 Noeh and Adnan, Sejarah Singkat, p. 33.
8 Steenbrink, Islam di Indonesia Abad ke 19, p. 217. Although the 1882 edict served as the legal charter for 
Islamic courts in Java and Madura for more than a century, that was probably not the intention of the 
colonial officials who formulated the law. To begin with, at the time the recommendations for the Islamic 
courts were forwarded to Den Haag there was substantial support among Dutch officials in the Indies for 
abolishing Islamic courts altogether. Steenbrink, Islam di Indonesia Abad ke-19, p. 220. And while the 
consensus favored continuation of the courts, some of those who joined the recommendation did so for 
political reasons with the anticipation that the courts would eventually be abolished. Ibid. More 
importantly, Harry Benda's assessment that the 1882 decree was not intended to vest judicial power in the 
penghulu is probably correct. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, 84. The requirement of an executory 
decree for the pronouncements of the penghulu's courts to be enforceable meant that, "[sjtrictly speaking, 
the members of these councils w ere. . .  no more judges than they were 'priests/ even in matters pertaining 
to their alleged jurisdiction." Ibid.
9 Staatsblad Nos. 116,610,639 (1937) discussed in Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, pp. 83-88 and 
Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 17-21. The reforms carried out in the 1930s were based on the report of a committee 
that had been set up in 1922 to study the Islamic courts. The Committee's recommendations were first 
embodied in a regulation issued in 1931, Staatsblad No. 53 (1931), which was not implemented until 1937 
because of budgetary constraints resulting from the depression. Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 17-18.
10 Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 64.
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more informed and uniform decision making.11 This aspect of the law was 
implemented with the formation of the Kerapatan Qadi Besar in Banjarmasin to serve 
the new courts in Kalimantan and the Mahkamah Islam Tinggi for Java and Madura.12
The most significant change made in 1937 related to the jurisdiction of the courts. 
The law transferred authority over inheritance from Islamic to civil tribunals.13 This 
left the Islamic courts with jurisdiction over marriage and divorce only. The same 
limitation was also applied to the new courts in South Kalimantan. The elimination of 
Islamic inheritance jurisdiction reflected the views of the so-called adat law school, a 
group of Dutch scholars and their Indonesian students who favored neither Islamic 
nor Dutch legal institutions but the customary rules (adat) of the archipelago's 
numerous ethnic groups.14 The priority given to adat over Islam found legal expression 
in the so-called reception theory, which holds that Islamic rules have the force of law 
only insofar as they have been received into the local adat.15 Apart from the doctrine's 
practical significance in restricting the applicability of Islamic law, shariah oriented 
Indonesians have, since its inception, considered the reception theory especially 
pernicious because of its denial of any independent standing for Islamic law.16
In preferring adat over Islam, the Dutch scholars of Indonesian custom and their 
Indonesian students were, in an important respect, simply aligning themselves on one 
side of a conflict that was both deeper and more enduring than the narrow legal 
question of whether Islamic or customary rules would govern inheritance questions.17 
Conceived most broadly, adat and Islam represent more than simply alternative sets of 
legal rules: they represent competing bases of social authority. From this broader and 
symbolically weightier perspective, the loss of jurisdiction over inheritance, which is 
everywhere regarded as a core religious concern for Muslims, represented a victory for 
anti-Islamic forces and a serious setback in the historic advance of Islam in the 
archipelago.18
11 Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 18-19.
12 Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 21. The Mahkamah Islam Tinggi was originally located in Batavia, but was moved 
to Surakarta during the war where it remained.
13 Staatsblad No. 116 (1937) discussed in Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, p. 88 and Lev, Islamic 
Courts, p. 21.
14 For a discussion of the views of the adat law scholars as they relate to the Islamic courts, see Benda, The 
Crescent and the Rising Sun, pp. 65-68; and Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 19-29. The ostensible reasons for Dutch 
support for custom over Islam were philosophical and scientific. Influenced by continental legal science, 
which viewed law as the organic outgrowth of a society's history and culture, the adat scholars promoted 
indigenous customary law as the only authentic expression of the ethos of Indonesian society. They 
supported their claims about the secondary place of Islam in the archipelago's legal culture by 
painstakingly cataloguing local customary practices which, they contended, demonstrated the limited 
extent to which Islamic rules were observed in fact. Of course, the promotion of local and particularistic 
customary law over universalistic Islam also served conservative Dutch political interests. Benda, The 
Crescent and the Rising Sun, p. 68.
15 Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 196-197.
16 See e.g. Hazairin, Hukum Kekeluargaan Nasional (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1962), pp. 4 -5  condemning the 
reception theory as "a theory of the devil, that defies the faith of Muslims, defies God, defies file Koran, 
and defies the Traditions of the Prophet."
17 Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 24-29.
18 Ibid.
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An effort was also launched in 1937 to reform the substantive law of marriage, 
although the initiative failed.19 For several decades, Indonesian women's groups had 
been agitating for legislation limiting or prohibiting polygamy and curbing the Muslim 
husband's power of unilateral repudiation.20 The colonial government's proposal 
would have established a registration procedure whereby a woman whose marriage 
had been registered gained legal protection against unilateral divorce and polygamy. 
The proposal was opposed both by Islamic groups, who saw it as an improper 
interference with the infallible and everlasting religious law, and by the major 
nationalist parties, who regarded it as an illegitimate intrusion by the Dutch into native 
affairs, and was withdrawn.21
With independence there occurred a number of changes of importance to Islamic 
courts, but the departure of the Dutch did not dramatically alter the terms of the 
debate over the courts or the balance of power between supporters and detractors.22 
One development that proved critical was the creation of the Ministry (later 
Department) of Religion.23 The establishment of the Ministry, then unique in the 
Muslim world, made possible the consolidation of the entire Islamic administration 
under a single authority and ensured that Islamic institutions would be under the 
control of Islamic groups, rather than that of more secular minded nationalists who 
dominated the Ministry of Justice and the rest of the state bureaucracy.24 Also critical 
to the courts' survival was the emergence of Islamic political parties, which were able 
to check to some degree the secularizing and modernizing impulses of the executive 
bureaucracy. Although Islamic leaders often disagreed over issues relating to Islamic 
courts and many favored the eventual absorption of the Islamic courts into the civil 
judiciary, there was enough support for the continued existence of a separate Islamic 
court system to prevent the abolition of the courts or further encroachment on their 
powers.25 Thus, by the time the nation's first law on judicial organization and 
procedure was enacted following the transfer of sovereignty,26 Islamic interests could 
marshal enough clout to secure the recognition of the existence of Islamic courts, even 
though the drafters of the statute in the Justice Ministry clearly favored their 
abolition.27 The 1951 statute did not expressly authorize Islamic courts, but stated that 
provision for the administration of Islamic justice would be made through a separate
19 The proposed marriage ordinance is discussed in Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, pp. 88-89; Jan 
Prins, "A dat law and Muslim Religious Law in Modem Indonesia," Welt des Islams 1 (1951): 283,294-95; 
and Cora Vreede-de Stuers, The Indonesian Woman: Struggles and Achievements (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 
1960), pp. 108-110.
20 On the early Indonesian women's movement see Vreede-de Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, pp. 89-99.
21 Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, pp. 88-89; Prins, "Adatlaw and Muslim Religious Law ," pp. 294- 
95; and Vreede-de Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, pp. 108-110.
22 See generally, Lev, Islamic Courts, ch. 2 ,3 .
23 Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 43-45.
24 Ibid.
25 See generally Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 63-75.
26 Law No. 1 (1951) discussed in Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 65.
27 The drafters of the measure suggested that the legislature be consulted about transferring the functions 
of the Islamic courts to the civil courts. Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 65. A 1948 law, never implemented because 
of events during the revolution, would have effected the immediate integration of the Islamic courts into 
the civil courts. Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 64-65; Noeh and Adnan, Sejarah Singkat, pp. 53-54.
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government regulation28—language that provided the foundation for the eventual 
establishment of a nation-wide system of Islamic courts.
Following the passage of the 1951 law, the Ministry of Religion, which had taken 
over administration of the Islamic courts on Java and Madura in 1946, set about to 
unify, centralize, and, to the extent possible, expand the Islamic court system into those 
parts of the country where courts were not then formally established.29 Over the next 
several years the Ministry worked with local leaders to acquire control over existing 
Islamic tribunals and established a limited number of new courts by means of 
ministerial regulations. The Ministry was also able to use local religious affairs offices, 
which existed throughout the country, to assert some control over the administration 
of marriage and inheritance in areas without Islamic courts. Finally, in 1957 the cabinet 
approved a regulation authorizing the formation of Islamic courts everywhere in the 
outer islands where they did not already exist.30 Patterned after the Royal Decree of 
1882, the 1957 regulation authorized the establishment of Islamic courts, labeled 
Pengadilan Agama/Mahkamah Syariah, wherever there were civil courts exercising a 
territorial jurisdiction co-extensive with the civil court.31 The new Islamic tribunals 
were to have the same collegial organization as the courts set up under the Dutch era 
regulations.32 Unlike the existing courts, however, the substantive competence of the 
new courts would include inheritance as well as marriage and divorce cases,33 
producing a disparity between the courts in Java, Madura, and South Kalimantan 
compared with the rest of the country.
The promulgation of the 1957 regulation, as a result of which there existed a legal 
basis for Islamic courts throughout the country, represented a significant victory for 
advocates of Islamic law. The issuance of the regulation was more a result of the 
persistent lobbying of the Ministry of Religion and a confluence of political 
developments that made the granting of concessions to Islam and the outer islands 
momentarily expedient than of any change in policy toward Islamic law.34 Shortage of 
funds prolonged the implementation of the regulation. By the early 1970s, however, 
first instance Islamic courts existed in most districts throughout the country, and 
additional appeals courts—four in Sumatra and one in Sulawesi—were added to 
existing appellate tribunals in Java and Kalimantan.35
Thus, the Islamic court system was able to survive and even expand in 
independent Indonesia despite opposition to the courts from some segments of the 
bureaucracy, especially the Ministry of Justice, whose lawyers—trained in the civil law 
tradition—considered the existence of sectarian tribunals to be incompatible with a
28 Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 65.
29 On the expansion of the court system see Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 75-92.
30 Gov. Reg. No. 45 (1957) discussed in Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 89 and Noeh and Adnan, Sejarah Singkat, pp. 
59-60. A government regulation requires approval by the full cabinet but not the legislature.
31 Gov. Reg. No. 45 Art. 1 (1957).
32 Ibid., Arts. 2 ,6 .
33 Ibid., Art. 4(1).
34 Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 89.
35 Noeh and Adnan, Sejarah Singkat, pp. 69-70.
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modem national state.36 But while defenders of Islamic courts had enough leverage to 
protect them against threats of abolition or absorption into the civil judiciary, the 
Islamic courts suffered from inadequate budgets and a general neglect that left them 
ill-housed and with staffs that were both too small and inadequately trained.37 Many 
courts, especially in the outer islands, did not have their own physical facilities; court 
sessions were held in the back rooms of other government offices or the residence of 
the court chairman.38 All Islamic courts suffered from insufficient support staff. Some 
courts did not have a full-time court chairman, but relied exclusively on part-time 
member judges.39 By comparison to civil court judges, Islamic court judges were badly 
paid and poorly educated.40
The post-independence era also witnessed a number of efforts to enact legislative 
reforms of Islamic marriage law, none of which, however, resulted in changes to the 
substance of Islamic rules. A statute passed in 1946 required that all marriages, 
repudiations, and reconciliations be registered in the local religious affairs office.41 
Failure to register could subject the party to a small fine, but did not affect the validity 
of the action. More ambitious proposals that would have affected substantive rights 
were considered by the legislature in both the late 1950s and again in the late 1960s, 
but none of the proposals was enacted.42
Although there were no similar legislative initiatives concerning Islamic 
inheritance law, the matter of inheritance provoked a scholarly debate in the 1950s and 
60s that laid the groundwork for developments in the late 1980s. The figure at the 
center of the debate, Professor Hazairin of the University of Indonesia, was Indonesia's 
most prominent and daring exponent of Islamic modernism, the jurisprudential theory 
that the original sources of Islamic law should be reinterpreted in light of 
contemporary social realities.43 Hazairin argued that the classical Islamic legal
36 The attitude of rivalry and mutual suspicion that has long characterized relations between the 
Ministries of Justice and Religion resurfaced recently in the controversy over the so-called Juvenile Courts 
Bill. In November of 1995 the Justice Department introduced a proposal for a new law regulating various 
legal issues relating to children, including adoption and guardianship. The proposal vested jurisdiction 
over these matters in the civil courts. See "Rancangan Undang-Undang tentang Peradilan Anak," in 
Mimbar Hukum 25 (1996): 131-155. The Department of Religion and Islamic organizations opposed the 
proposal on the ground that it derogated from the powers of the Islamic courts. After a long and 
acrimonious debate, the offending provisions were removed and the bill was finally passed in December 
of 1996. "Aturan Anak Nakal itu Lahir," Gatra (January 4,1997).
37 Information on the condition of the courts can be found in H. Ichtijanto, "Pengadilan Agama Sebagai 
Wadah Perjuangan Mengisi Kemerdekaan Bangsa," Kenang kemngan Seabad Peradilan Agama di Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Dep. of Religion, 1985), pp. 258-280; Lev, Islamic Courts, ch. 4; H. Mastur Jahri, "Memperingati 
Seabad Peradilan Agama yang Jatuh Pada Tahun 1982 ini," Kenang kenangan Seabad Peradilan Agama di 
Indonesia (Jakarta: Dep. of Religion, 1985), pp. 349-361.
38 H. Ichtijanto, "Pengadilan Agama Sebagai Wadah Perjuangan," pp. 265-266; Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 112; 
H. Mastur Jahri, "Memperingati Seabad Peradilan Agama," p. 359.
39 H. Ichtijanto, "Pengadilan Agama Sebagai Wadah Peijuangan," pp. 265-266.
40 Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 104-112.
41 Law No. 22 (1946) discussed in Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 53-58.
42 Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 139; Vreede-de Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, pp. 124-140.
43For brief discussions of Hazairin's views see B.J. Boland, The Struggle af Islam in Modem Indonesia (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 168-170 and Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 219. Hazairin's most important
150 Mark Cammack
doctrines that developed in the Arabian Peninsula were incompatible with Indonesian 
circumstances, and advocated the development of a distinctively Indonesian school of 
Islamic law or "mazhab" alongside the four existing schools. He paid particular 
attention to inheritance law, arguing that the patrilineal bias of classical inheritance 
doctrine was incompatible with both Indonesian social realities and the spirit of the 
Koran.44
Hazairin's views won some adherents in academic circles, but had little influence 
on judges or policy makers. During this period, both the Islamic bureaucracy and the 
religious courts were dominated by "traditionalists" committed to following the legal 
doctrines (fiqh) of the early jurists as contained in the classical legal texts.45 A quarter 
century later, however, the principle of an Indonesian mazhab would provide part of 
the justification for state intervention in the development of Islamic legal doctrine.
The change in administration following the events of 1965 raised expectations 
among many Muslims that organized Islam would play a larger role in the country's 
public life in the new regime than it had under Sukarno. It soon became apparent, 
however, that Muslim support for Suharto in his bid for power—support that was 
probably critical to his success—would not translate into Muslim participation in the 
exercise of power once Suharto's authority was established.46 Upon assuming control, 
the new regime systematically set about to consolidate the primacy of the executive 
bureaucracy and to emasculate political parties and other non-state sources of political 
power.47 Although all groups challenging the dominance of the bureaucracy came 
under suspicion, during its first two decades, the Suharto government was especially 
repressive of Islamic groups, which were regarded as the chief threat to stability 
following the elimination of the communist party.48 Nor did strongly identified 
Muslims acquire influence within the bureaucracy, the upper echelons of which were 
dominated by military officers not oriented toward Islam. Indeed, beginning in 1971 
organized Islam lost control of the Ministry of Religion, its traditional stronghold 
within the government, when Professor Mukti Ali, a Western trained educator with 
strong ties to neither of the major Islamic groups, was appointed Minister of Religion.49 
An even more significant appointment was made seven years later when the Religion
works include Hazairin, Hukum Kewarisan menurut Qur'an dan Hadith (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1958) and 
Hazairin, Hukum Kekeluargaan Nasional (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1962).
44 Boland, The Struggle of Islam, pp. 169-70.
45 See generally Lev, Islamic Courts, ch. 7.
46 See generally Ruth McVey, "Faith as an Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Politics," Islam in the Political 
Process, ed. James P. Piscatori (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 199-225.
47 See Benedict Anderson, "Old State and New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative 
Perspective," Journal of Asian Studies 42 (May 1983): 477-96, characterizing the change from the Sukarno to 
Suharto regimes as entailing a shift in emphasis from "national" to "state" interests.
48 See David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983 (Ithaca: Cornell 
Modem Indonesia Project, 1984), pp. 29-32, discussing the "Islam-phobia" of Suharto's inner circle of 
advisors.
49 McVey, "Faith as an Outsider," p. 208.
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portfolio was given to General Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara, a military man and 
member of Suharto's inner circle of advisors.50
Muslim expectations that the New Order would be friendlier toward Islamic law 
than the Old also proved mistaken 51 By 1973, two years after the government scored a 
decisive victory over Muslim parties at the polls, Islamic courts were fighting for their 
survival. In July of that year the administration put forward a marriage law proposal 
which, on its face, would have thoroughly secularized Indonesian marriage law and 
effectively abolished much of the country's Islamic court system.52 Both the 
Department of Religion and organized Islam were largely excluded from the 
preparation of the draft.53 Although this was ostensibly a Department of Justice 
initiative, the impetus for the proposal apparently came from the influential clique of 
informal Presidential advisors lead by Ali Murtopo and the group's Catholic 
dominated research arm, the Center for Strategic and International Studies.54 This 
group was not especially concerned about Islamic courts per se, but found the 
marriage law issue provided them with an opportunity to strike a blow at political 
Islam.55
The proposal provided for a single set of marriage and divorce rules applicable to 
all Indonesians regardless of religion. It required civil registration for marriage and 
court approval for divorce and polygamy.56 Both divorce and plural marriage, 
moreover, would become subject to tight restrictions.57 Enforcement of the law was to 
be entrusted to the civil courts,58 which would have reduced the jurisdiction of the 
outer island courts to matters of inheritance only and left the Islamic courts in Java, 
Madura, and South Kalimantan with literally nothing to do.
50 Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, p. 79. Because positions in the Department of Religion are not 
attractive to most university graduates, these changes in the leadership of the Department did not 
necessarily permeate the rank and file.
51 For instance, shortly after Suharto took over, Muslim groups mounted an effort to revive the so called 
Jakarta Charter, a constitutional provision imposing an obligation to carry out Islamic law, that had been 
considered and rejected in 1945. The Suharto government, however, was unreceptive. Allan A. Samson, 
"Islam in Indonesian Politics," Asian Survey 8 (1968): 1001,1012-1013.
52 For a discussion of the terms of the proposal see Mark Cammack, "Islamic Law in Indonesia's New 
Order," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38 (1989): 53,57-65; Muhammad Kamal Hassan, 
Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Pustaka 
dan Bahasa, 1980), pp. 148-56; June Katz and Ronald Katz, "The New Indonesian Marriage Law: A Mirror 
of Indonesia's Political, Cultural, and Legal Systems," American Journal of Comparative Law 23 (1975): 653- 
81.
53 "RUU Perkawinan, Aksi dan Reaksi," Tempo, September 8,1973, pp. 6-8. See also Leo Suryadinata, 
Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar (Athens: Ohio University Center for 
International Studies, 1989), pp. 76-77.
54 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 313. This 
"invisible cabinet" originated with the appointment of a small Presidential "private staff" in 1966. 
Although the private staff was officially disbanded in 1968 in response to student protests, a changing 
group of informal Presidential advisors continued to exercise great influence thereafter. Ibid., pp. 243 ,307- 
309; Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, pp. 23-24.
55 Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 313.
56 Katz and Katz, "The New Indonesian Marriage Law ," p. 661.
57 Ibid.
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The proposal met with angry and determined Muslim opposition both inside and 
outside the legislature.58 9 At one point several hundred Muslim youth occupied the 
floor of the legislature, and the army had to be called in to restore order.60 A solution to 
the conflict was reached only after high-ranking military officers initiated discussions 
with Muslim leaders outside the formal legislative process.61 The parties to this 
negotiation agreed to a framework for revising the bill, in which Muslim interests 
acceded to demands for legal restrictions on arbitrary divorce and polygamy in 
exchange for promises that the substantive law of marriage would not be altered and 
the role of the Islamic courts not diminished.62 A statute implementing this agreement 
was approved by the legislature in late 1973 and signed into law by the President as 
the 1974 Marriage Act.63
The effect of the 1974 Marriage Act on Indonesian Islamic law is a matter of 
dispute. Many Muslims have hailed Article 2(1) of the law, which states that a 
marriage is valid when it is performed according to the religious law of the parties, as 
marking the first formal recognition of Islamic rules as Indonesian law and the end of 
the hated reception theory. A more extreme version of this view interprets that 
provision as importing the entire corpus of Islamic marriage doctrine into state law. 
The Supreme Court and the Department of Religion, on the other hand, have been 
promoting a dramatically different interpretation of the Marriage Act, which attaches 
more importance to the positive content of the statute than to Islamic doctrine.64 
According to this interpretation, the Act effects significant changes in the marriage law 
of Indonesian Muslims, including registration as a requirement for marriage and court 
approval for divorce and polygamy. It is my contention that the 1989 Religious 
Judicature Act is, at least in part, an effort to influence the outcome of the debate over 
the meaning of the Marriage Act.
III. The 1989 Religious Judicature Act
The Minister of Religion presented the government's proposal for a new law 
governing Islamic courts to the Indonesian legislature in December of 1988. 
Consideration of the bill continued throughout the following year, during which time 
it was widely debated in the public press. The public discussion focused primarily on 
the broad question whether a separate system of sectarian courts was appropriate for
58 Cammack, "Islamic Law in Indonesia's New O rder," pp. 57-58.
59 For an account of the controversy provoked by the proposal, see Donald K. Emmerson, Indonesia's Elite: 
Political Culture and Cultural Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), pp. 229-235.
60 "Ada 'Allahu Akbar' dari Luar," Tempo, 6 October 1973, pp. 6-7.
61 "Dan Lahirlah UU Itu-Dengan Afdruk Kilat," Tempo, 29 December 1973, pp. 5-8. See also Crouch, The 
Army and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 313-314. The meeting was apparently an attempt by General Sumitro, 
then head of the internal security apparatus, to exploit the marriage law controversy in his simmering 
rivalry with Ali Murtopo. Suryadinata, Indonesia's Golkar, pp. 77-78.
62 Katz and Katz, "The New Indonesian Marriage Law ," p. 663.
63 Law No. 1 (1974). An English translation of the statute is contained in B. B. Hering, "A  Translation of 
the Indonesian Marriage Law ," ed. B. B. Hering, Indonesian Women: Some Past and Current Perspectives 
(Brussels: Centre D'Etude du Sud-Est Asiatique et de L'Extreme Orient, 1976), pp. 91-114. For a good 
summary of the law see Nani Soewondo, "The Indonesian Marriage Law and its Implementing 
Regulations," Archipel 13 (1977): 283-294.
64 See Cammack, "Islamic Law in Indonesia's New O rder," pp. 63-65.
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an officially pluralist nation.65 That issue, however, was not really open to debate in 
1989. By the time the Bill was introduced the survival of the Islamic courts was 
virtually assured as a result of changes made following the implementation of the 1974 
Marriage Act. In December of 1989 the legislature approved the Bill with only minor 
changes from the original draft, and it was signed into law by the President shortly 
thereafter.
The Act is contained in 108 sections divided into seven chapters. As with all 
legislative enactments in Indonesia, it is accompanied by an official elucidation that 
provides a section by section commentary on the text.
Chapter I is labeled "General Provisions" and contains sections on the definitions, 
status, location, and organization of the Islamic courts. It defines the "Religious 
Judiciary" (Peradilan Agama)66 as the "judiciary for adherents of Islam."67 This judiciary 
consists of "Religious Courts" (Pengadilan Agama), identified in the following chapter68 
as courts of first instance, and "Religious High Courts" (Pengadilan Tinggi Agama), 
which exercise appellate jurisdiction.69 Together they "exercise judicial power" for 
Muslim litigants limited to civil matters specified in the Act.70 The first instance courts 
are to be located in municipalities (Kotamadya) or district (Kabupaten) capitals with 
territorial jurisdiction throughout the municipality or district. Appeals courts are to be 
located in the provincial capitals with province-wide jurisdiction 71
The specification of a uniform designation for Islamic courts throughout the 
country replaces the three different labels under which the courts had operated in the 
past. Like so much else in the Act, this change had already been effected by means of a 
Ministerial Decision several years earlier.72 In 1989, there were more than three- 
hundred first instance Islamic courts operating in most districts and municipalities 
throughout the country, and appeals tribunals had been established in eighteen of the 
country's twenty-seven provinces.73
65 See Peradilan Agama dalam Wadah Negara Pancasila: Dialog tentang RUUPA, ed. H. Zuffran Sabrie (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Antara, 1990) which contains a collection of several dozen press reports focusing on this issue.
The proposal encountered comparatively little serious opposition in the legislature. Initially, Golkar was 
divided over the Bill. Those opposed to the measure objected that it perpetuated legal dualism in violation 
of Pancasila. "Sebuah RUU dengan Lapang D ada/' Tempo, 24 June 1989, p. 26. However, when the Golkar 
faction formally stated its position on the Bill, it came out in favor. The Democratic Party supported the 
Bill with reservations. Both the Unity Development Party and the Military faction strongly supported it. 
"Peradilan Agama: Kebutuhan atau Kecemasan," Tempo, 24 June 1989, p. 22.
66 The Democratic Party voiced strong public objection to the title of the Act on the ground that it 
establishes not "Religious" courts but Islamic courts. See e.g. "Pembahasan Judul RUUPA Berjalan Alot," 
Jawa Pos, 26 September 1989. It is fair to assume that the objection was not only to the accuracy of the label 
but also to the existence of a separate set of sectarian courts.
67 Chap. I, Art. 1(1). Unless otherwise indicated, citations to statutory authorities refer to the 1989 Act.
68 Chap, n , Art. 6.
69 Chap. I, Art. 1(2).
70 Chap. I, Art. 2.
71 Chap. I, Art. 4.
72 Decision of the Minister of Religion No. 6, January 28,1980.
73 "Peradilan Agama: Kebutuhan atau Kecemasan," Tempo, 24 June 1989, p. 24. By 1996 the only provinces 
without Islamic High Courts were Bali and East Timor. Based on Department of Religion Statistics.
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The Act assigns responsibility for what is labeled "technical juridical" matters to 
the Supreme Court while the organization, administration, and finances of the courts 
are under the auspices of the Minister of Religion.74 This division of responsibility for 
Islamic courts between the Supreme Court and the Department of Religion represents 
a change from the practice that had prevailed until the late 1970s. As noted, the 
Ministry of Religion had assumed administrative control of the Islamic courts in 1946. 
As an adjunct to that administrative function, the Directorate of Religious Justice, the 
division of the Ministry responsible for the courts, had also exercised some control 
over the law the courts applied, and eventually acquired powers of appellate review in 
1964.75 Around this same time Justice Ministry officials were urging the creation of an 
Islamic chamber in the Supreme Court to serve as a court of cassation for the Islamic 
system.76 For a time the Directorate of Religious Justice lent guarded support to this 
limited integration of the Islamic courts into the civil system as a means of improving 
the profile of the courts without entirely losing their identity.77 Other segments of the 
Islamic community—Islamic political leaders and probably most Islamic judges— 
opposed the idea on the ground that the courts should remain tied to the Islamic 
community rather than attaching themselves more firmly to a non-Islamic state. When 
a new Basic Law on Judicial Authority was passed in 1970, supporters of the idea of an 
Islamic chamber had enough influence to gain inclusion of a provision granting the 
Supreme Court review powers over all Indonesian courts, including the Islamic court 
system.78
Nothing was done to enforce the Supreme Court's powers with respect to Islamic 
courts until after the implementation of the Marriage Act. Then in 1977 the Supreme 
Court issued a regulation establishing procedures for Supreme Court review of Islamic 
court decisions.79 The Directorate of Religious Justice initially resisted the move, 
instructing Islamic courts not to cooperate with litigants seeking cassation in the 
Supreme Court. The conflict was finally resolved following a meeting between the 
Minister of Religion and the chairman of the Supreme Court that resulted in the 
appointment of six Supreme Court justices to an Islamic panel.80 This ushered in a new 
era in relations between the Department of Religion and the Supreme Court. By the 
time the Religious Judicature Bill was proposed, the Supreme Court had assumed a 
major role in the administration of the Islamic courts in addition to the exercise of its 
review powers over those courts.
74 Chap. I, Art. 5.
75 Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 95-96.
76 Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 70-75. The Department of Justice supported Religion's effort to retain 
administrative control over the Islamic courts in order to protect its own prerogative as the administrative 
head of the civil court system. The Indonesian bar had long advocated placing the civil courts under the 
auspices of the Supreme Court as a means of promoting their independence, and continues to do so. Lev, 
Islamic Courts, p. 74, n.15.
77 Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 71-75.
78 Law No. 14, Ch. II, Art. 10(3) (1970).
79 See Cammack, "Islamic Law in Indonesia's New Order," pp. 66-67 and sources cited therein.
80 "Perkembangan Hukum Islam dan Peradilan Agama di Indonesia," in Kenang Kertangan Seabad 
Peradilan Agama di Indonesia (Jakarta: Department Of Religion, 1985), pp. 47-48.
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Chapter II of the Act governs the structure and composition of the courts.81 Among 
its more significant provisions are the rules treating the appointment and qualification 
of judges. The power to appoint and terminate judges is vested in the President as 
Head of State upon the recommendation of the Minister of Religion and the agreement 
of the Supreme Court.82 The provision granting the Supreme Court a voice in the 
selection of judges, which had been the practice for several years before the Act was 
proposed, formalized Supreme Court involvement in the management of the Islamic 
judiciary contrary to the earlier tradition of exclusive Religion Department control.
Articles 14 and 15 of Chapter II specify the qualifications for judges. Appointment 
as an Islamic judge requires, among other things, that the candidate be a civil servant, 
hold a law degree or a shariah degree, and be a Muslim.83 The requirements that all 
Islamic judges have academic credentials and civil service status represent a change 
from prior law. As noted, under the 1882 statute only the court chairman was a civil 
servant, and prior law did not specify any educational qualifications for judges, the 
vast majority of whom did not have university degrees.84 Both the educational 
qualification and civil service status for judges had been enforced as a matter of 
executive policy for several years before the statute was proposed,85 and by the time 
the Act was passed significant progress had already been made toward their full 
implementation.86 With the passage of the Act, all judges not meeting its requirements 
were retired. Since most of those who served as Islamic judges before the mid-1970s 
did not meet the qualifications required under the Act, the effect of the imposition of 
the new qualifications was dramatically to transform the Islamic judiciary over the 
space of less than two decades.
Chapter III specifies the powers of the Islamic courts. Article 49 states that 
"Religious Courts have the responsibility and authority to examine, decide, and 
resolve cases at the first instance between Muslims in the areas of: a) marriage; b) 
inheritance, testaments, and gifts, that are performed according to Islamic law; c)
81 Articles 7 and 8 provide that first instance courts are created by Presidential decree and high courts by 
statute. The first instance courts are to consist of the court "administration" (pimpinan) made up of the 
chair and deputy chair, member judges, clerks, secretarial staff, and the new position of bailiff/huissier
(juru sita) necessitated by the courts' new enforcement powers. Chap. II, Arts. 9(1), 10(1). The high courts 
are made up of the administration, including a chair and deputy, high court judges as members, clerks 
and secretaries. Chap, n , Arts. 9(2), 10(2),(3).
82 Chap. H, Art. 15(1).
83 Chap, n , Art. 13. Appointment as a high court judge includes the same requirements as well as a 
minimum age and a requirement of at least fifteen years service as a first instance judge. Chap. II, Art. 14. 
The other statutory employees are all appointed by the Minister of Religion. Chap. II, Arts. 36 ,40 ,47 .
None need be civil servants; all are required to be Muslims. Chap, n, Arts. 27-34,39,45. With the exception 
of the bailiff, all statutory employees are required to have some post-secondary education. Chap. II, Arts. 
27-34,39.
84 Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 111.
85 See Standarisasi Pengadilan Agama dan Pengadilan Tinggi Agama (Jakarta: Department of Religion, 1983), 
pp. 94-95. See also Cammack, "Islamic Law in Indonesia's New O rder," pp. 68-70.
86 Between 1977 and 1985 the number of full time civil servant Islamic judges tripled, rising from 225 to 
765. Cammack, "Islamic Law in Indonesia's New Order," p. 69. By 1989 the number of Islamic court 
judges had risen to over 1200. "Pengadilan Serambi Milik Kita Bersama," Tempo, 4 February 1989, p. 76. In 
1983,401 of the total 680 full-time judges were college graduates compared to only 12 college degree 
holders among all chief judges a decade earlier. Cammack, "Islamic Law in Indonesia's New O rder," p. 70.
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charitable foundations."87 The high courts are granted appellate jurisdiction 
coextensive with the competence of the lower courts.88
The courts' jurisdiction over marriage is further specified as relating to "matters 
regulated in or based on applicable marriage legislation."89 This vague reference is 
clarified in the elucidation as referring to the 1974 National Marriage Act.90 The 
elucidation then lists twenty-two specific subject areas relating to marriage that are 
treated in the National Marriage Act. The effect of granting the Religious Courts 
plenary authority to apply the Marriage Act for Muslims is significantly to expand the 
courts' powers. Prior to die passage of the Religious Judicature Bill, the competence of 
the Islamic courts extended only to those matters that had been treated in executive 
implementing regulations issued in 1975 91 All other matters had to be referred to the 
civil courts. The regulations that had been issued under the 1974 Marriage Act covered 
matters relating to the validity of marriage, including the granting of permission to 
enter a polygamous marriage or dispensation from statutory age requirements, and the 
procedures for dissolving marriages. They did not address child custody following 
divorce or any matters relating to financial obligations or property rights after 
termination of the marriage. The Supreme Court had held that in the absence of 
government regulations implementing the Act's provisions on these matters, they were 
to remain under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The enumeration of powers in the 
elucidation to the Religious Judicature Act makes it clear that these matters are now 
within the authority of the Islamic courts.
The provision granting all Islamic courts power to decide issues of property 
distribution following death is likewise a change from prior law, since the Islamic 
courts for Java, Madura, and South Kalimantan had lost their inheritance jurisdiction 
in the 1930s. The Act clarifies the courts' inheritance powers as including "designation 
of heirs, designation of the estate, designation of individual shares, and distribution of 
the estate."92 Resolution of disputes regarding ownership of property remains under 
the jurisdiction of the civil courts.93
As a practical matter the restoration of the courts' inheritance jurisdiction may not 
be as significant as it appears. First, although the courts for Java, Madura, and South 
Kalimantan lacked formal jurisdiction over inheritance matters prior to the passage of 
the Act, many people had been taking non-contentious inheritance questions to Islamic 
courts for "advisory opinions" (fatwa).94 These opinions were made enforceable by 
means of a private agreement to abide by the court's decision that was negotiated by
87 Chap, m , Art. 49.
88 Chap, m , Art. 51.
89 Chap, m , Art. 49(2).
90 Religious Courts Act, Law No. 7, Elucidation to Art. 49(2) (1989).
91 Supreme Court Directive of August 20,1975. See also Cammack, "Islamic Law in Indonesia's New 
O rder," pp. 65-66 and cases cited therein.
92 Chap, ffl, Art. 49(3).
93 Chap, m , Art. 50.
94 Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 199-205. See also Mura Hutagalung, "Faktor-Faktor yang Menpengaruhi 
Mengapa Banyak Orang Menyelesaikan Masalah Kewarisan Melalui Pengadilan Agama," Hukum dan 
Pembangunan 13, no. 5 (September 1983): 409-416.
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the parties under the supervision of the court. Moreover, the Act includes an important 
limitation on the courts' inheritance jurisdiction buried in the introduction to the 
elucidation. It is there provided that before the initiation of proceedings the parties can 
decide to select the law that will be used in the division of the estate. This "choice of 
law" provision was hotly debated during the consideration of the Bill.95 The principle 
that the claimants to an estate be allowed to choose the legal regime governing 
distribution of property has its source in the historic debate over the extent to which 
Islamic rules had supplanted adat in matters of inheritance. The argument advanced by 
opponents of state enforcement of Islamic rules—that the state should not be a party to 
the Islamization of the country—prevailed, resulting in the provision for an election 
determining whether Islam or adat should govern distribution of property on death.
Chapter IV treats procedure in Islamic courts. The first part of the Chapter contains 
general provisions, beginning with the general rule that the procedural law to be 
followed in Islamic courts is that contained in the Code of Civil Procedure and 
applicable in the civil courts, except as specifically provided in the Act.96 This first part 
also contains provisions relating to the means of exercise of judicial power generally as 
well as provisions unique to Islamic courts. For instance, one section requires that 
justice be carried out "with simplicity, expedition, and minimal expense," and also 
provides that decisions and decrees be opened with the recital of the Bismillah,97 the 
ritual invocation of God's name that occurs at the beginning of each surah of the Koran. 
Other provisions require that in order to be valid, decisions and decrees must be 
announced in open court,98 and that decisions and decrees must recite the reasons and 
basis for the result, including specific statutory provisions or unwritten law.99
Part two of the Chapter lays out special procedural rules for divorce actions. It 
begins, however, with the general injunction that "Divorce can only be carried out 
(dilakukan) in open court after the court has attempted unsuccessfully to reconcile die 
parties."100 This provision is potentially very significant if construed as denying the 
validity of a Muslim husband's unilateral repudiation of his wife or talak. However, the 
language of the provision, which is identical to that contained in a provision of the 
National Marriage Act,101 is ambiguous. As will be discussed below, the comparable 
provision in the Marriage Act was widely interpreted as rendering judicial divorce 
mandatory, giving rise to penalties for those who do not comply, but not affecting the 
legal validity of a non-conforming talak. As will become clear, moreover, the whole 
question of the legal effect of extra-judicial talak was a principal theme of the debate 
during the legislative consideration of the bill.
95 See e.g. "Dua Pasal RUUPA Harus Dihapus," Serambi Indonesia, August 5,1989; "Disepakati Pilihan 
Hukum," Suara Karya, October 5,1989; "Akhimya Lancar, Pembahasan Selesai Lebih Cepat Satu H ari," 
Kompas, October 5,1989; "RUUPA: Bisakah Mandiri?" Kiblat, October 23-November 5,1989.
96 Chap. IV, Art. 54.
97 Chap. IV, Arts. 57(2), (3).
98 Chap. IV, Art. 60.
99 Chap. IV, Art. 62(1).
100 Chap. IV, Art. 65.
101 National Marriage Act, Law No. 1, Art. 39(1) (1974).
158 Mark Cammack
The Act next specifies three different procedural schemes for three different types 
of divorce: talak divorces; "complaint" (gugat) divorces; and divorces on grounds of 
adultery. The procedures for talak divorces, which generally track corresponding 
portions of the executive regulations issued in 1975 to implement the Marriage Act,102 
provide for a husband to recite the repudiation formula or talak—"I divorce you"—in 
court under judicial supervision. According to classical Islamic doctrine, a husband has 
an absolute power to repudiate his wife at any time for any reason. Under the Act, 
following the 1975 regulation, a husband wishing to repudiate his wife must file a 
petition requesting the court "to convene to witness his pronouncement of the talak."103 
In a modest change designed to provide greater protection to wives, the husband must 
file his petition with the court in the district where his wife resides, rather than in his 
own district, as permitted by the 1975 regulation.104
The husband's petition must recite the name, age, and residence of both parties, as 
well as "the reasons that form the basis for the talak divorce."105 The Act does not 
specify what reasons qualify as sufficient reasons.106 The court must examine the 
petition in closed session within thirty days after the file is enrolled by the clerk.107 In 
keeping with the policy of attempting to reduce the frequency of divorce, the court is 
charged with attempting to reconcile the couple at the first hearing108 and then 
throughout the pendency of the case.109 If the couple cannot be reconciled and if there 
are "sufficient reasons for divorce the court decrees that the petition is granted."110
The Act provides that the wife may appeal the court's decree declaring that there 
exist grounds for a talak111 Only after the decree has become final through the 
exhaustion of all appeals or the expiry of the period for filing an appeal does the court 
schedule a hearing for the purpose of witnessing the husband's talak112 This procedure 
was established by means of a Supreme Court Circular issued in 1985.113 Before the 
issuance of the circular, the wife could appeal the sufficiency of the husband's reasons 
for divorcing her only after the divorce became effective through the husband's 
pronouncing the talak. This procedure was unacceptable from the Muslim perspective 
because the talak was an accomplished fact that could in nowise be invalidated through
102 Gov. Reg. No. 9, Arts. 14-18 (1975).
103 Chap. IV, Art. 66(1).
104 Chap. IV, Art. 66(2). There is an exception to this rule when the wife "intentionally leaves their 
common home without the petitioner's permission." Ibid.
105 Chap. IV, Art. 67.
106 A list of grounds for divorce is contained in the official elucidation of the 1974 National Marriage Act, 
Art. 39(2), and also in the government's implementing regulation for the 1974 Act. Gov. Reg. No. 9, Art. 19 
(1975).
107 Chap. IV, Art. 68.
108 In order to facilitate the reconciliation function the parties are required to appear personally at this first 
session unless one of the parties lives out of the country. Chap. IV, Art. 82(2).
109 Chap. IV, Arts. 69,82(1), (4).
110 Chap. IV, Art. 70(1).
111 Chap. IV, Art. 70(2).
112 Chap. IV, Arts. 70(3), (4). The wife must be notified of the hearing, but the husband or his delegated 
representative can recite the talak in her absence. Chap. IV, Art. 70(4), (5).
113 Supreme Court Circular No. 13, August 19,1985.
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a judicial decision on appeal. Reformers, on the other hand, were anxious that there be 
some means for an appeal of the first instance court finding of sufficient grounds in 
order to preserve the contentious nature of the action and impose meaningful limits on 
the husband's power to divorce his wife. The device used by the statute of simply 
deferring the pronouncement of the talak until any appeals have been completed 
provides an adequate solution for the narrow problem it addresses. However, the 
problem of appealing a talak exemplifies a broader difference in interests and outlooks 
that the Act must negotiate. Stated most broadly, the difference is between a view 
which sees law as emanating from the law-making organs of the state and a view 
which sees the source of law in the revealed word of God.
A woman wishing to be divorced from her husband proceeds under the 
"complaint" procedure outlined in the following part.114 Like the rule setting forth the 
talak procedure, the complaint procedure largely follows the pattern set out in the 
implementing regulations to the 1974 Marriage Act.115 Furthermore, though not 
explicitly stated in the text, the drafters undoubtedly contemplated the continuation of 
the courts' practice under the 1975 regulations. The Islamic courts had interpreted the 
complaint procedure in the regulations as simply vindicating the courts' powers to 
grant divorces initiated by women in accordance with Indonesian Islamic doctrine. The 
Shafi'i school of Islamic law as applied in Indonesia recognized a number of means by 
which a dissatisfied wife could terminate her marriage.116 Unlike her husband, all the 
divorce options for wives required cooperation of the court. In applying the Marriage 
Act and its implementing regulation, the courts had essentially assimilated traditional 
Islamic doctrine to the list of grounds for divorce stated in die positive law.117 That is, 
the specific grounds stated in the statute were identified with one of the avenues for 
divorce recognized in Islamic law. For instance, the statutory grounds of irreconcilable 
differences was interpreted as a codification of the Islamic syiqaq procedure. Syiqaq is 
ostensibly a mechanism for resolving differences between spouses through 
appointment of arbiters for each. However, it had evolved into a divorce procedure 
once it became recognized that the husband's arbiter, typically one of the judges, had 
the power to terminate the marriage if reconciliation efforts failed. Following the 
effective date of the Marriage Act and its implementing regulations, the Islamic courts 
"applied" the rule regarding divorce based on irreconcilable differences by appointing 
arbiters as required by the syiqaq procedure. The Act contains no list of grounds for 
complaint divorces. It was clearly anticipated that the courts would continue to apply 
the substantive law in effect before the Religious Judicature Act was passed, which 
was understood to be essentially Islamic doctrine. Indeed, the Act expressly provides 
for the appointment of arbiters when the complaint is "based on the grounds of 
syiqaq."118
114 Chap. IV, Arts. 73-86.
115 Gov. Reg. No. 9, Arts. 20-36 (1975). In the Regulation the complaint procedure is theoretically available 
to either husband or wife. The Act makes it clear that it is for the only party to the marriage who would 
have occasion to use it, that is, the wife. Chap. IV, Art. 73.
116 The substantive law of divorce applied by Indonesian Islamic courts prior to the passage of the 
Marriage Act is summarized in Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 153-178.
117 See Cammack, "Islamic Law in Indonesia's New Order," pp. 63-65.
118 Chap. IV, Art. 76.
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The complaint initiating the proceeding is to be filed in the court in the district 
where the complainant resides unless the wife has left the marital residence without 
permission,119 a change designed to redress the unequal legal standing of women. The 
complaint procedure contains the same charge to the judge to try to reconcile the 
couple120 and the same rules and timetable for examining the complaint as are 
contained in the talak procedure.121
On the issue of proof, the Act states that a copy of a judgment of conviction is 
sufficient proof when the asserted ground for the complaint is that the husband has 
been convicted of a crime and sentenced to prison,122 and that the court can order the 
husband to submit to a physical examination when the basis of the complaint is that he 
suffers from a handicap or illness which prevents him from performing his conjugal 
obligations.123 As observed, the statute also sets out the syiqaq procedure. Apart from 
these references, however, there is no specification of the kinds or quantities of 
evidence required to prove either a talak or a complaint claim. The Act states that the 
court's "decision" on the complaint is to be announced in open court and that the 
divorce and its consequences are deemed to have occurred from the time the court's 
decision acquires file force of law.124
The third type of divorce action regulated by yet another set of procedural rules is 
divorce based on adultery. The explanation for the separate treatment of adultery cases 
lies, once again, in Islamic doctrine, specifically the procedure known as lian. The lian 
divorce procedure derives from the criminal law.125 A Muslim husband who suspects 
his wife of adultery takes four solemn oaths that his wife has committed unchastity or 
that the child bom to her is not his. The wife is then offered the chance to deny the 
accusation with four oaths of her own. The requirement that the parties swear four 
times to the same thing has its source in the requirement of testimony from four 
witnesses to prove the crime of adultery, and if the wife refuses to make her denial she 
stands convicted of that crime. If she does deny, then the only effect of file procedure is 
permanently to dissolve the marriage.
The proposal codified the traditional lian procedure, but broke from tradition by 
making it available to either spouse. Not surprisingly, the inclusion of the lian rule was 
controversial.126 Publicly expressed opposition to the provision insisted that the rule 
had no place in an essentially procedural statute because of its substantive character, 
and that the extension of the lian option to wives was inconsistent with Islamic 
doctrine.127 It seems likely that a more important but unstated basis for opposing the
119 Chap. IV, Art. 73(1).
120 Chap. IV, Arts. 82(1), (4).
121 Chap. IV, Art. 80.
122 Chap. IV, Art. 75.
123 Chap. IV, Art. 75.
124 Chap. IV, Art. 81.
125 See Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 165.
126 See e.g., "PDI Minta RUUPA Diluruskan," Media Indonesia, September 26,1989; "Tidak Ada Maksud 
untuk Mengubah Hukum Islam," Pelita, October 3,1989.
127 See H. Achmad Roestandi and Muchjidin Effendie, Komentar atas Undang-Undang No. 7 Tahun 1989 
tentang Peradilan Agama (Bandung: Nusantara Press, 1991), p. 18 stating that two (unidentified) legislative
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proposal is the highly irrational character of the rule. In the enacted version the rubric 
for the procedure is changed from "lian" to "divorce on account of adultery." Another 
amendment provides for a different procedure depending on whether the charge is 
brought by husband or wife. If the husband makes the oath of accusation the case 
proceeds and is resolved according to the lian procedure. When a wife accuses her 
husband then the case is resolved under the "applicable rules of procedure."128
The inclusion of the lian procedure reflects the basically modernist jurisprudential 
outlook of the Act.129 Although, as discussed above, Islamic modernism authorizes the 
reinterpretation of the original sources to meet changing needs, the limits of legal 
change are highly restrictive. The standard modernist position authorizes a 
reinterpretation of rules based on authorities deemed uncertain, but insists on strict 
adherence to those legal doctrines that are based on divine texts that are certain.130 
Because the lian procedure is regulated in some detail in the Koran,131 the premises of 
modernist jurisprudence require its recognition.
The influence of Islamic modernism in the preparation of the Act is indicative of a 
more general shift in the position of modernist Islam vis-a-vis the Indonesian state. In 
contrast to die situation before 1970s, the upper echelons of the Department of Religion 
are now dominated by modernists, the most notable example being H. Munawir 
Sjadzali, the two-term Religion Minister who shepherded the Act through the 
legislature and whose legal reform proposals in the 1980s sparked a firestorm of 
controversy.132 The overhaul of the Islamic judiciary that resulted from the imposition 
of new educational qualifications in the early 1980s has also changed the profile of the
factions had objected to the lian proposal on the grounds that it was substantive rather than procedural 
and violated Islamic doctrine. See also H. Munawir Sjadzali, "Landasan Pemikiran Politik Hukum Islam 
dalam Rangka Menentukan Peradilan Agama di Indonesia/' Hukum Islam di Indonesia: Pemikiran dan 
Praktek, ed. Eddi Rudiana Arief (Bandung: PT Remaja Rosdakarya, 1991), pp. 41-67 containing the 
government's response to objections to the draft in which the Minister of Religion rejects the GOLKAR 
faction's argument that the matter of divorce on grounds of adultery is fully addressed in the Marriage 
Act.
128 Chap. IV, Arts. 87,88.
129 The simple "modernist v. traditionalist" distinction obscures a great deal of diversity of viewpoint 
within those broad approaches. It is also true that there are other interpretive traditions that cannot fairly 
be labeled either modernist or traditionalist. Nonetheless, the basic distinction between those who 
advocate adherence to the interpretations of the classical era jurists (traditionalists) and those who 
advocate a return to the original sources (modernists) remains a useful one.
130 See A1 Yasa Abu Bakar, "Beberapa Teori Penalaran Fiqih dan Penerapannya," Hukum Islam di 
Indonesia: Pemikiran dan Praktek, ed. Eddi Rudiana Arief (Bandung: PT Remaja Rosdakarya, 1991), pp. 173- 
208 for a succinct statement of this view by an Indonesian Islamic scholar.
131 Koran xxiv, pp. 6-9. See also Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, 4th ed. (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1974), p. 166. Modernist influence is more apparent in the recently implemented 
Compilation of Islamic Law, which is discussed above. The most obvious example of refusal to move 
beyond the terms of scripture is in the provisions on inheritance. For instance, the chapter that defines 
intestate shares includes the provision that female children receive one-half the share of male children. 
Apart from being inconsistent with modem notions of equality, this rule was never widely practiced in 
Indonesia. Its inclusion in the Compilation is explainable only on the modernist principle that there can be 
no derogation from those legal rules that are clearly stated in the Koran.
132 See e.g. Polemik Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam (Pustaka Panjimas: Jakarta, 1988) containing a collection of 
responses to the Minister's proposals for inheritance law reform.
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Islamic bench. Once the preserve of traditionalist judges trained exclusively in 
pesantren, the courts are now overwhelmingly staffed by graduates of the State Islamic 
Institutes, which are decidedly reformist in orientation.133
The remainder of Chapter IV and the last three chapters of the Act address a 
variety of technical matters including costs,134 the responsibilities of court personnel,135 
and a set of concluding provisions repealing conflicting statutes and providing that the 
Act shall take effect on the date that it is enacted.136
IV. An Indonesian Mazhab: The Case of Talak Divorces
Like many legislative enactments, the 1989 Religious Judicature Act is not an 
expression of any one purpose or coherent ideology or set of policies. It reflects, rather 
the outcome of a negotiation in which no single interest or outlook was able 
completely to have its way.
To illustrate the various conflicting tendencies embodied in the Act, I propose to 
take a closer look at one narrow aspect of the statute—its treatment of divorces 
initiated by men. The provision governing talak divorces was one of the more 
contentious features of the proposal. The reason the talak provision engendered 
controversy is that the question of the husband's power unilaterally to repudiate his 
wife focuses the disagreement between two conflicting points of view. It engages both 
the jurisprudential conservatism of the advocates of state enforcement of Islamic law 
and the statist orientation of the New Order's leaders. An examination of the Act's 
treatment of the issue in the context of the broader history of New Order policy toward 
Islamic law shows that the Act failed to resolve the tension between the two 
tendencies. Instead it effects an unsteady compromise, the precise terms of which are 
the subject of continuing negotiation.
In order to appreciate the tensions that lie behind the divorce provisions of the 
Religious Judicature Act, it is useful to recount the course of divorce reform legislation 
beginning in the early 1970s. The government's 1973 draft national marriage law 
would have abolished the talak by converting divorce into a contentious judicial
133 See Cammack, "Islamic Law in Indonesia's New Order," p. 70. Nur Ahmad Fadhil Lubis has 
confirmed the basically modernist outlook of the current Islamic judiciary. In a survey of approximately 
one hundred Islamic court judges conducted in the late 1980s, a large majority agreed that thefiqh texts are 
not always compatible with Indonesian circumstances and agreed on the need for reformation of Islamic 
institutions to meet changing needs. Nur Ahmad Fadhil Lubis, Islamic Justice in Transition: A Socio-Legal 
Study of the Agama Court Judges in Indonesia (PhD dissertation, UCLA, 1994), pp. 322-23.
134 The Act states the general rule that "Litigation costs for marriage actions are charged to the petitioner 
or the complainant." Chap. IV, Art. 89(1). Included in die statutory costs are fees for clerks, witnesses, 
experts, translators, evidentiary reconstructions, and costs of summonses and other official 
announcements. Chap. IV, Art. 90(1).
135 The chapter is clearly not a comprehensive treatment of die subject For instance, nothing in this 
chapter or any other treats die voting rules for die court or even die number of judges required for a court 
quorum. It was assumed, presumably, that matters not addressed in the statute will be regulated 
according to prior practice. That which is included in the chapter is not particularly noteworthy. Most 
often mentioned is die specification of responsibilities of the bailitf/huissier in enforcing court orders. This 
is significant because prior to the passage of the Act, enforcement of Islamic court orders had to be 
obtained through the civil courts.
136 Chap VII, Art. 107,108.
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proceeding. The draft stated that anyone wishing to divorce must prove statutory 
grounds in court, included an exhaustive list of legal grounds, and required that the 
court's "decision" terminating the marriage had to be announced in open court.137
The divorce provisions in the enacted version differed in important respects from 
the initial draft. The treatment of divorce in the statute itself is very brief, by its own 
terms incomplete, and on its face extremely obscure. The statute states only that 
marriage can be terminated by death, divorce, or court decision; that divorce must be 
"performed" in court; that before a divorce can be carried out there must be sufficient 
reasons; and that procedures for divorce would be set forth in separate implementing 
regulations.138 The statute itself does not specify what reasons qualify as "sufficient 
reasons" for divorce, but a list of grounds for divorce is contained in the official 
elucidation accompanying the Act.139
The intent of these obscure provisions became clear only in the government's 
implementing regulations140 and the practice of the courts. Under the regulations as 
interpreted by the courts, a Muslim man wishing to divorce his wife must file a 
petition with the Islamic court for permission to repudiate his wife. The regulation 
directs the courts to examine the petition to determine if it is based on statutory 
grounds, and to convene for the purpose of witnessing the husband's repudiation only 
if the court finds the couple can no longer live together in harmony. After witnessing 
the husband's talak, the court verifies the divorce by issuing a "Certificate Respecting 
the Occurrence of a Talak."141
The appeal of this scheme from the Islamic perspective is its recognition of the talak 
as the mechanism for dissolving the marriage. In the Muslim understanding die statute 
does not alter the substance of the divine law but simply institutes procedures for its 
enforcement. Instead of prescribing legal grounds or conditions for divorce, the statute 
seeks to control the incidence of divorce by imposing legal requirements for the use of 
the husband's talak. From the Muslim perspective at least, the law regulates the 
occurrence of legally significant events, rather than declaring new legal meanings. And 
since the law addresses itself exclusively to when a man may repudiate his wife and 
not to the issue of when the repudiation is effective, a talak pronounced in violation of 
the Act may be illegal but is nonetheless efficacious.142
137 Draft Marriage Law, Arts. 4 0 ,4 1 ,42(e) (1973).
138 National Marriage Act, Law No. 1, Arts. 38-40 (1974).
139 National Marriage Act, Law No. 1, Elucidation to Art. 39(2) (1974).
140 In fact the regulations are far from clear. Indeed, there seems to have been a deliberate effort by the 
drafters to avoid explicitly describing the divorce procedure as a court sanctioned talak. The word talak 
occurs only once, a single reference buried in the elucidation to the regulation. Even that reference seems 
unnecessarily obscure. It states simply that the procedure laid out in die regulation governs talak divorces.
141 Gov. Reg. No. 9, Arts. 14-17 (1975).
142 The popular interpretation of the Marriage Act as essentially a dead letter was advertised around the 
country in 1985 when Oma Irama, a popular film and music personality, married a second wife without 
obtaining judicial approval and then divorced his first wife through an extra-judicial talak, neither of 
which is permitted under the Marriage Act. At the time, Oma Irama was easily Indonesia's most popular 
entertainer and enjoyed wide name recognition throughout the country. His actions and example carried 
special significance because of his strong identification with Islam. Both his music and films are filled with 
explicit religious themes.
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The Religious Judicature Act abjures the coy approach of the Marriage Act and 
explicitly provides that the procedure for divorces initiated by men involves a court- 
sanctioned talak. Like the Marriage Act, however, the language of the Bill equivocates 
on the question whether compliance with its procedures, though unquestionably 
obligatory, is necessary for the divorce to be valid.
The debate over the proposal clearly indicated the existence of conflicting views on 
that question. At one point during the consideration of the Bill, the Unity Development 
Party—the government contrived coalition that functions as the only authorized voice 
for Muslim interests in the legislature—proposed an amendment to Article 66 that 
would have recognized the validity of extra-judicial talak.u 3 Under the proposed 
amendment, which went nowhere, a husband who either wished to or "had already 
repudiated his wife" could petition the court to certify his action.143 44 Despite the failure 
of the amendment, the Unity Development faction maintained in its comment on the 
final draft of the Bill that the language of the statute did not preclude a finding that 
extra-judicial talak are valid. Citing the Basic Law on Judicial Authority for the 
proposition that judges may take account of "the legal values that exist in society," the 
comment argued that, "in calculating the wife's waiting period [following an extra­
judicial talak], due consideration must be given to religious precepts."145 What this 
means, expressed ever so indirectly, is that judges can find that extra-judicial talak are 
legally effective. The Armed Forces faction countered with its own interpretation of the 
relevant provisions in its final written comments to the Bill. Its comment states flatly 
that the statutory language means that "as a matter of law talak divorces are valid only 
if performed in court."146
There was no attempt to resolve this difference before passage of the law. An 
unequivocal declaration that extra-judicial talak either do or do not have the force of 
law would undoubtedly have created a serious obstacle to the Bill's approval. This 
absence of clarity on such an important point was not viewed as problematic. Like 
many legislative enactments, this statute was not regarded as providing a definitive 
resolution of what the law is, but as providing a basis for a continuing negotiation over 
what the law should be. Moreover, the ambiguous and inconclusive character of the
News of Oma Irama's having taken a second wife and then divorcing his first made headlines in 
Jakarta's sensationalist "red press" for months. It was a deep embarrassment to government efforts to 
assert authority over Moslem marriage practices. Popular opinion of Oma Irama's actions varied. He was 
criticized for his insensitivity toward his first wife, who was unaware of the polygamous marriage. He 
was also faulted for not respecting Indonesian law. But there was seemingly universal recognition of the 
explanation for his actions as an acknowledgement of the ultimate authority of the religious law of 
marriage and divorce.
143 See Roestandi and Effendie, Komentar, 18; "Tidak Ada Maksud untuk Mengubah Hukum Islam," 
Pelita, October 3,1989; "Masalah Cerai-talak A lot," Suara Katya, October 3,1989.
144 "Tidak Ada Maksud untuk Mengubah Hukum Islam," Pelita, October 3,1989.
145 “Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan DPR-RI terhadap Rancangan Undang-Undang 
tentang Peradilan Agama," in H. Achmad Roestandi and Muchjidin Effendie, Komentar atas Undang- 
Undang No. 7 Tahun 1989 tentang Peradilan Agama (Bandung: Nusantara Press, 1991), pp. 213-223.
146 "Pendapat Akhir Fraksi ABRI atas Rancangan Undang-Undang tentang Peradilan Agam a," in H. 
Achmad Roestandi and Muchjidin Effendie, Komentar atas Undang-Undang No. 7 Tahun 1989 tentang 
Peradilan Agama (Bandung: Nusantara Press, 1991), pp. 199-212.
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provision provided the opening for the Supreme Court and the Department of Religion 
gradually and quietly to promote their interpretation of what the law means.
A 1990 circular containing instructions for the implementation of the Act indicates 
the direction the Supreme Court wishes to take the law and the means by which this is 
being accomplished. It states that "A talak divorce is in principle a contentious 
marriage action between the two parties to the case, and as a consequence the judicial 
product from the judges must have the form and title of decision with an order in the 
form of decree."147 The import of labeling the judges' output as a "decision" is to give or 
attempt to give the proceeding a judicial cast. This is in line with the general purpose 
of the directive which is to discourage the treatment of talak proceedings as simply 
ministerial ceremonies that result in an official recognition of the occurrence of a talak. 
By characterizing the proceeding as a contentious action, the circular emphasizes the 
judges' role as adjudicators having the power to grant or withhold approval of the 
divorce subject to the husband's proving legislatively prescribed grounds. The change 
represents at best a partial step toward the eventual aim of acquiring state control over 
Islamic divorces. But it is precisely by means of such obscure and incremental actions 
that the government is attempting to move its agenda forward.
Another much more significant vehicle by which the Supreme Court and 
Department of Religion are pressing an alternative interpretation of Islamic divorce 
rules is the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The Compilation is an Indonesian language 
manual of rules covering marriage, divorce, inheritance, and charitable foundations. It 
was drafted under the direction of the Department of Religion and the Supreme Court 
over a period of several years,148 and given the force of law in 1991 through a 
presidential decree.149 In addition to the classical texts of Islamic legal doctrine, other 
sources that were surveyed in the preparation of the Compilation included works on 
Islamic law by Indonesian scholars, the rulings of Indonesian Islamic organizations, 
the decisions of Indonesian Islamic courts, and legislation from other countries. The 
ostensible purpose of the project was to provide certainty and uniformity in the 
application of Islamic law. It has also been the means by which the government has 
attempted to promote an understanding of Islamic law consistent with its aims.
The Compilation provides a more comprehensive treatment of the law of divorce 
than the Religious Judicature Act, including some thirty-six articles on the subject. The 
general approach tracks the Marriage Act and the Religious Judicature Act in setting 
up two procedures, one available only to men, in which the husband repudiates his 
wife in court, and the other for women. Like the Religious Judicature Act, the 
Compilation does not explicitly declare extra-judicial talak invalid. But the suggestion 
in the Compilation that a talak without judicial approval does not have the force of law 
is stronger than in the Act. The Compilation, like the Act, states that a divorce can only 
be performed in court150 and that a husband who wishes to repudiate his wife must file
147 Supreme Court Circular No. 2 (April 3,1990).
148 A description of the project by the Supreme Court Justice who chaired it can be found in Bustanul 
Arifin, "Kompilasi: Fiqh dalam Bahasa Undang-Undang," Pesantren 2, no. 2 (1985): 25-30.
149 Pres. Ins. No. 1 (June 10,1991).
150 Compilation of Islamic Laws, Chap. XVI, Art. 115.
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a petition with the court to convene for that purpose.151 But the Compilation also says 
that "A talak is a declaration of the husband in the presence o f the members o f the court that 
constitutes one cause of the dissolution of marriage."152 Read literally, this language 
would seem to indicate that an extra-judicial repudiation is not a “talak" and therefore 
is of no effect. Another provision states that "Divorce takes effect from the moment it is 
expressed in the presence of the members of the court."153 This provision likewise 
suggests that a husband's attempt to repudiate his wife outside of statutory procedures 
is ineffective, though the use of the generic word for divorce rather than the word talak 
creates some ambiguity.
That which is obliquely intimated in the Compilation of Islamic Law is stated with 
unmistakable clarity in a comment on the text written by a Justice of the Supreme 
Court.154 The article, entitled "Codifying the Abstractions of Islamic Law," is contained 
in a periodical published by the Department of Religion and designated as required 
reading for all Islamic judges. Sounding a popular modernist refrain, the article begins 
by distinguishing fiqh—temporal rules—from shariah—the eternally correct path of 
life.155 The author goes on to explain that the fiqh  that were derived by the medieval 
jurists and contained in the classical texts are not "Islamic law," since they represent 
only the opinions of their authors. Nor do the Koran and the Traditions comprise 
Islamic law since they hardly present a comprehensive treatment of legal problems. 
Thus, the author concludes, in the fiqh  and the Koran Indonesian society has only 
"abstractions" of Islamic law.156 Hence the necessity for a codification of these 
abstractions in the Compilation of Islamic Laws.
The author then proceeds to elaborate his jurisprudential theory for the derivation 
of legal rules from the divine sources, and summarizes the aims and content of the 
Compilation. Among the avowed purposes of the Compilation is to "banish the 
understanding [of law] as a private affair." The traditional understanding of Islamic 
law, the author writes, has been that the principles of the law are regarded as a private 
matter between the individual and God. As a result, it is a matter in which the state 
may not interfere. But with the implementation of the Compilation, the application of 
the law is no longer left in the hands of individuals. "The emergence of the 
Compilation inaugurates a new era in Indonesian history, in which Islamic law has 
been elevated to the status of valid civil law that has a public character and can be 
enforced by the instrumentalities of the state."157
The author also offers an analysis of the substance of the Compilation, including 
the divorce provisions. As interpreted by the Supreme Court Justice, the talak 
procedure is "elevated to the status of a contentious proceeding," and he states
151 Compilation of Islamic Laws, Chap. XVI, Art. 129.
152 Compilation of Islamic Laws, Chap. XVI, Art. 117 (emphasis added).
153 Compilation of Islamic Laws, Chap. XVI, Art. 123.
154 M. Yahya Harahap, "Informasi Materi Kompilasi Hukum Islam: Mempositifkan Abstraksi Hukum 
Islam ," Mimbar Hukum 3, no. 5 (1992): 21-63.
155 Ibid., p. 22.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
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unequivocally that extra-judicial talak "are not valid and not binding."158 With this the 
government has successfully achieved the essence of what it failed to accomplish with 
its original secular marriage law proposal in 1973. The differences between the failed 
legislative proposal and the doctrine as it has been developed are in the mechanism by 
which the divorce is actually effected—by means of the husband's court-supervised 
talak—and the symbolic underpinning of the rules. Unlike the marriage law proposal, 
the asserted basis for the authority of the rules in the Compilation is as Islamic law. By 
means of the Compilation, the government seeks to transcend the conflict between 
state and religious lawmaking authority. Although the authority of the rules remains 
grounded in religion, the state now becomes the authoritative interpreter of the 
religious tradition. As a result, it is no longer Islamic law, but Indonesian Islamic law 
that regulates intimate social relations.159 Once a challenge to state lawmaking, Islam 
now becomes its vehicle.
V. Conclusion
The Religious Judicature Act effects an unstable accommodation between two 
opposing outlooks. On the one hand the Act shows the unmistakable influence of 
Islamic modernism. Modernist legal theory embraces the use of human reason to 
reinterpret the original sources of Islamic law in light of contemporary needs and 
circumstances, but only within defined limits. While modernism rejects the absolute 
authority of thefiqh  as the temporal product of a different social and historical context, 
it insists on a strict, literal enforcement of those doctrines that have a clear textual basis 
in the primary sources—the Koran and the Hadith.160
The more interesting implication from the Act has to do with the Indonesian state. 
The recent evidence from Islamic law suggests that the adoption by the New Order of 
a more Islamic demeanor has not significantly tempered the regime's statist impulses. 
Behind the appearances there is a remarkable continuity in New Order policy toward 
Islamic law over the course of nearly twenty-five years. In the early 1970s powerful 
elements within the government perceived a political advantage in weakening or 
abolishing Islamic courts and marginalizing Islamic doctrine. By the late 1980s a 
changed political context had induced the regime to change its posture toward Islamic 
legal institutions.161 Instead of restricting the scope of Islamic law and curtailing the
158 Ibid., p. 52.
159 As Justice Harahap put it, "It is as if Indonesia has created its own doctrine (fiqih) and school (mazhab), 
distinct from the schools that have existed in the past." Ibid., p. 37.
160 Clifford Geertz summed up the failure of Islamic modernism or "scripturalism" to escape the 
constricting influence of textual literalism: "Stepping backward in order better to leap is an established 
principle in cultural change. . .  But in the Islamic case the stepping backward seems often to have been 
taken for the leap itself, and what began as a rediscovery of the scriptures ended as a kind of deification of 
them ." Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 69.
161 Cf. R. William Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation," journal of Asian Studies 
55 (August 1996): 613-634 arguing that the Suharto government's support for the reformist oriented 
Association of Muslim Intellectuals or ICMI is designed to derive political advantage from the 
Islamization of Indonesian society. For a different view of the significance of ICMI see Robert W. Heftier, 
"Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class," Indonesia 56 
(1993): 1-35.
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powers of Islamic courts, a different group of power brokers began enfranchising the 
religious courts and enforcing Islamic doctrine. Although the government's attitude 
toward official Islam had seemingly reversed itself, its more basic objective of 
acquiring control over Indonesian family law remained unchanged. Having settled on 
a policy of cultivating rather than confronting Islam, the government set about to 
assert greater influence over Islamic courts and to establish itself as the authoritative 
interpreter of a distinctively Indonesian Islamic legal tradition. Rather than competing 
with Islam for legislative authority, the government is seeking to appropriate the 
power to declare Islamic law. Instead of defeating Islam, the regime has decided to 
confiscate it.
How far the current accommodation between Islamic modernism and New Order 
statism can be maintained remains to be seen. There is an inherent tension between a 
view which believes in and feels entitled to state enforcement of a set of fixed religious 
doctrines, and the premises of state positivism, which locate an absolute and 
indivisible legal sovereignty in the lawmaking organs of the state.162 If my analysis is 
correct, moreover, the government is nourishing the present modus vivendi with Islamic 
modernism by encouraging, or at least tolerating, a level of misapprehension of its 
intentions. Insofar as the government has indicated a commitment to enforcing Islamic 
doctrine as interpreted by the Islamic community, those indications are misleading.163 
Although the government's regulatory efforts are now articulated with a vocabulary 
supplied by Islam, the regime's basic objective of expropriating control over 
Indonesian family law remains unchanged.
162 See John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe 
and Latin America, 2d ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), pp. 19-22; Gianfranco Poggi, The 
Development of the Modem State: A Sociological Introduction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), pp. 
87-92.
163 Cf. e.g. H. Muhammad Daud Ali, "Soal Anak Sudah Diatur Syariah," Mimbar Hukum 25 (1996): 33-38, 
in which a leading modernist scholar of Islamic law states, in opposing a proposal for a statute governing 
juvenile courts, that adoption and other matters relating to children are regulated in the original sources of 
Islamic law, and that state rules contrary to Islamic doctrine will not be obeyed.
